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PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME: THE DEBATE SURROUNDING
CRIMINAL DEFENSE
INTRODUCrION
This past summer the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
updated its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV),' and added
premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD), a severe form of premen-
strual syndrome,2 to the list of depressive disorders. This new classifi-
cation is controversial among feminists and women's health activists
due to the implications PMDD may have for the legal field and for
society in general.' The new classification of PMDD will impact as-
pects of criminal as well as civil law.4 For instance, the PMS defense,
already used in criminal trials in England5 and the United States,6 will
have a more solid foundation now that the APA classifies PMDD as a
psychiatric disorder.7 Although some view the PMS defense as a posi-
tive development,' it is important to recognize other, broader societal
ramifications. Feminists fear that the inclusion of PMDD in the DSM-
IV will lead to discrimination in the workplace, the family, and the
community.9
1. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL IV
(1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV MANuAL]. Published by the APA, the manual describes nearly
300 different psychiatric disorders. DSM-IV is the basic diagnostic reference tool for
mental health professionals. Constance Holden, Proposed New Psychiatric Diagnoses Raise
Charges of Gender Bias, 231 Sci. 327, 327 (1986). Insurance companies and lawyers also use
the manual. Id.
2. DSM-IV MANUAL, supra note 1, at 715-18. Premenstrual dysphoric disorder is a se-
vere form of "PMS" characterized by dysfunctional mood and behavior. Holden, supra
note 1, at 327.
3. Position Paper by Paula Caplan, Psychologist at the University of Toronto, to the
Legislative Assembly of the American Psychiatric Association (on file with author). Over
six million individuals and many organizations, such as the American Psychological Associ-
ation, the Women's College Hospital in Toronto, and the National Organization of Wo-
men, have voiced opposition to the classification. Id.; see also Paula Span, Vicious Cycle: The
Politics of Periods; After Tomorrow, Many Women May Be Told They're Plain Crazy, WASH. POST,
July 8, 1993, at Cl.
4. Span, supra note 3, at C2.
5. Joseph K Tybor, Women on Trial New Defense, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 1.
6. Lawrence Taylor & Katharina Dalton, Premenstrual Syndrome: A New Criminal De-
fense?, 19 CAL. W. L. Rxv. 269, 276-77 (1983).
7. Span, supra note 3, at Cl, C2.
8. Holden, supra note 1, at 328.
9. Span, supra note 3, at C2. Feminists question whether this disorder will be used
against women in their quest to obtain custody of children. Id. The National Women's
Health Network drafted a sample letter for use by its members to protest the APA's deci-
sion to include PMDD in the new diagnostic manual. The letter argued that there was no
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This Comment will first explain premenstrual syndrome by exam-
ining the myths, history, and medical data surrounding the menstrual
cycle. It will then analyze the American Psychiatric Association's clas-
sification and the debate surrounding the creation of the PMDD cate-
gory in the DSM-IV. Finally, this Comment will discuss how the new
psychiatric "disorder" supports a criminal defense based on premen-
strual symptoms and what broad societal impact may ensue.
Prior to the PMDD classification, it was difficult to mount a suc-
cessful PMS defense because of divergent definitions within the medi-
cal community and because PMS was considered a hormonal, not a
mental, illness. 10 The new PMDD classification eliminates many of
these difficulties and may lead to the increased use of premenstrual
symptoms either as a defense or as a mitigating factor in criminal tri-
als. " Although the defense will help women who commit crimes
while suffering from severe PMS, this benefit must be weighed against
the potential damage to women in the workplace, in civil trials, and in
society in general.
I. BACKGROUND
Myths surrounding women's menstrual cycle have pervaded all
societies, cultures and religions for centuries. 2 Philosophers legiti-
mized these myths by explaining women's physical characteristics in
negative terms.' "But it was not until the advent of modem science
that the patriarchal view of women as inherently inferior was alleged
to be grounded in biological 'fact'."14 For hundreds of years, medical
theories have provided sexist rationalizations for women's inferior so-
cial status. 5 Nineteenth century medical theories viewed a woman's
natural state as one of illness.' 6 Scientists saw menstruation as proof
sound empirical basis for PMDD and the classification would endanger women socially,
politically, and economically. PMS Diagnosis Protested, NETWORK NEWS (The National Wo-
men's Health Network, Wash., D.C.), May/June 1993, at 5.
10. See generally Linda R. Chait, Premenstrual Syndrome and Our Sisters in Crime: A Feminist
Dilemma, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 267, 271 (1986) (noting that PMS was considered a "de-
fense without merit"); see also PAULA CAPLAN, THEY SAY YOU'RE CRAYz. HOW THE WORLD'S
MOST POWERFUL PSYCHiATRISTS DECIDE WHO's NoRMAL (forthcoming 1995).
11. Span, supra note 3, at C2.
12. Chait; supra note 10, at 272. "Menstrual taboos are found universally and are
thought to originate in male abhorrence of the menses, which is attributed to a fear of
blood." Id. at 272 n.63.
13. Id. at 271-73.
14. Id. at 273.
15. Id. at 277.
16. Id. at 275. "Abnormalities from irritability to insanity were traced to some ovarian
disease." Id.
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of this theory, lending scientific reality to the myth. 17 Premenstrual
syndrome, and more recently premenstrual dysphoric disorder are
the latest additions to this mythology.
In 1931, endocrinologist and gynecologist, Robert Frank, first de-
scribed premenstrual syndrome and attributed the changes in wo-
men's personalities to fluctuations in the ovarian hormones.18 In
1965, Doctors Hamish Sutherland and lain Stewart defined premen-
strual syndrome as "any combination of emotional or physical features
which occur[s] cyclically in a female before menstruation, and which
regress[es] and disappear[s] during menstruation."19 Dr. Katharina
Dalton, 20 an expert in the field of premenstrual syndrome, defines
PMS as a hormone deficiency disease that "includes a wide variety of
symptoms which regularly recur in the same phase of each menstrual
cycle, followed by a symptom-free phase."21 The condition is noted to
be most acute in the last seventh (premenstruum) and the first sev-
enth (menstruation) of a twenty-eight day cycle which is subdivided
into seven four-day intervals.22
17. Id.
18. Robert T. Frank, The Hormonal Causes of Premenstrual Tension, 26 ARCHrVES NEUROL-
OGY & PSYCHIATRY 1053 (1931). Frank's conclusions were later supported by Dr. Joseph
Morton's research in 1946 through 1950. SeeJoseph H. Morton, Chronic Cystic Mastitis and
Sterility, 6J. CusNic.AL ENDOCRINOLOGY 802 (1946). By the mid-1950s, PMS was recognized
as a distinct medical entity which interfered with the health of many women. Chait, supra
note 10, at 277.
19. Hamish Sutherland & lain Stewart, A Critical Analysis of the Premenstrual Syndrome, 1
LANCET 1180, 1182 (1965); see also Robert M. Carney & Brian D. Williams, Recent Decisions,
59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 255 (1983).
20. Dr. Dalton is the director of the Premenstrual Syndrome Clinic at the University
College Hospital in London, England. Over a 30 year period, she has studied approxi-
mately 30,000 cases and written many books and articles regarding this disorder. Addition-
ally, Dr. Dalton served as an expert witness in Regina v. Craddock, Regina v. Smith, and Regina
v. English, the three leading cases that established PMS as a defense in British criminal
trials. Tybor, supra note 5, at 12.
21. Taylor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 271-72.
22. Aleta Wallach & Larry Rubin, The Premenstrual Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility,
19 UCLA L. REV. 210, 219 (1971).
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There are many symptoms characteristic of PMS,2 s and doctors
cannot agree on the most common ailments.24 Nor do medical ex-
perts agree on the cause of premenstrual syndrome.25 For instance,
Dr. Dalton believes that an excess of estrogen in relation to progester-
one during the premenstrual phase causes PMS.2 6 Other theories that
define the causes of premenstrual tension include: 27 the rise and fall
of both estrogen and progesterone; the rapid decline in a metabolite
of a neurotransmitter; yeast overgrowth in the intestines; allergies;
and psychological stress.28
Another source of uncertainty about premenstrual syndrome is
the frequency with which it occurs.29
Estimates of the incidence of PMS vary according to the
breadth of the definition used. One study suggests that
nearly twenty percent of all women requires treatment for
the syndrome. Another study suggests that between seventy
and ninety percent of the female population experiences
PMS symptoms, while twenty to forty percent suffers tempo-
rary mental or physical incapacitation due to PMS.3
0
23. Pre-Menstrual Syndrome (PMS) or Menopause? It's Hard to Tell! A FRIEND INDEED FOR
WOMEN IN THE PRIME OF LIFE (A Friend Indeed Publications, Inc., Montreal, Quebec) Nov.
1987, at 1-3 [hereinafter (PMS) or Menopause? It's Hard to Tell.']. The following symptoms
may occur premenstrually when suffering from "PMS": abdominal bloating, abdominal
cramping, absentmindedness, accident-proneness, acne, alcohol intolerance, anger, anxi-
ety, asthma, backpain, breast swelling and pain, cardiac arrhythmias (irregular heartbeats),
confusion, crying, depression, dizziness, eating disorders, edema, eye difficulties, fainting,
fatigue, food binges, hand tingling and numbness, headaches, hemorrhoids (flairups),
herpes (oral, skin, genital), hives, indecisiveness, infections, insomnia, irritability, joint
swelling and pain, lack of coordination, lactation difficulties, lethargy, muscle aches, nau-
sea, noise sensitivity, palpitations, panic states, paranoia, pimple eruptions, rashes, salt crav-
ings, seizures, (lack of) self-esteem, sex-drive changes, slurred speech, smell sensitivity,
spaciness, stiff neck, sties, suicidal thoughts, sweet cravings, tension, tiredness, touch sensi-
tivity, urinary difficulties, violence, weight gain, and withdrawal. Id. at 2-3.
24. Carney & Williams, supra note 19, at 255. Dr. Dalton believes that irritability, an-
ger, confusion and other behavioral symptoms are most common. Other doctors identify
physical symptoms such as headaches, swelling of the breast. Id.
25. PMS or Menopause? It's Hard to Tell!, supra note 23, at 5-6.
26. Id. at 5; see also Wallach & Rubin, supra note 22, at 219 (stating theories of hormo-
nal influence predominate among doctors).
27. Some early literature used the diagnosis as "Premenstrual Tension Syndrome" to
describe the same symptoms as found in premenstrual syndrome. But, premenstrual ten-
sion is actually only one characteristic of PMS. Wallach & Rubin, supra note 22, at 212 n.9.
28. PMS or Menopause? It's Hard to Tell!, supra note 23, at 5-6.
29. Robert L. Reid & S.C. Yen, Premenstrual Syndrome, 139 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL-
oG 85, 86 (1981). "Efforts to compare epidemiologic data on PMS are likely to be mis-
leading because of variable interpretation of the clinical manifestations and the obvious
difficulties encountered in quantitating [sic] the severity of symptoms." Id.
30. Carney & Williams, supra note 19, at 257. The difficulties in determining the
number of women suffering from PMS may be the result of inconsistent definitional re-
574 [VOL. 54:571
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Premenstrual syndrome is distinguishable from premenstrual discom-
fort. The latter is experienced by most menstruating women, while
PMS is a more serious exacerbation of the condition that a lesser, yet
substantial, number of women experience."1 Dr. Dalton provides an
example of a woman with PMS, which illustrates the severity of the
syndrome:
Janet is a thirty-year-old housewife living in London,
England. She is in most respects a "normal" individual, ex-
cept that seven days before the beginning of her menstrual
periods she begins to experience irritability and tension
which accelerate into aggressive and violent behavior toward
her husband, her children, and even herself. This monthly
reaction began when Janet was a teenager: in the interven-
ing years she has attempted suicide by ingesting overdoses of
aspirin and of valium, by slashing her wrists, by stabbing her-
self, and by jumping from a train. Each of these suicide at-
tempts occurred during her premenstrual cycle. On the first
day of meristruation, however, all symptoms ease and she be-
comes calm, friendly, and rational.12
Despite extensive research and diagnostic progress with PMS,
many questions remain concerning the premenstrual condition.33
PMS often remains undiagnosed and untreated due to its breadth of
symptoms and the readiness of persons to categorize sufferers as sim-
ply neurotic.3 4 These factors have created a double-edged sword. If
ignored and not recognized as a true medical condition, many women
who suffer from the syndrome will continue to lack treatment.3 5 But,
if society recognizes the condition, it could be viewed as evidence of
women's biological inferiority.3 6 Dr. Michelle Harrison explains the
dilemma surrounding premenstrual syndrome.
The feminist in me wishes that our biology were irrele-
vant. The doctor in me sees the need for recognizing and
treating premenstrual symptoms. The woman in me recog-
nizes the power of the biological forces within me, and
quirements. For example, if the definition includes commonplace dysmenorrhea, the inci-
dence of the syndrome would increase. Wallach & Rubin, supra note 22, at 232 n.95.
31. Wallach & Rubin, supra note 22, at 212-13.
32. Taylor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 269.
33. Chait, supra note 10, at 278.
34. Wallach & Rubin, supra note 22, at 214.
35. Betsy A. Lehman, A Little Revision is Creating a Big Furor, BosTON GLOBE, May 10,
1993, at 17.
36. Chait, supra note 10, at 271.
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wishes I lived in a society in which my menstrual cycle were
seen as an asset, not a liability.
3 7
II. APA's CLASSIFICATION
A. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
In 1952, the American Psychiatric Association created the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).-s The origi-
nal handbook listed several dozen mental illnesses and accompanying
definitions.39 In 1968, the book was restructured to coincide more
closely with the mental disorders listed in the International Classifica-
tion of Diseases and the book was retitled DSM-II. ° In 1974, the APA
once again decided to revise the manual.4" Toward this end, the APA
formed a committee of nineteen mental health professionals to clarify
the diagnoses as well as the scientific research associated with each
classification.42 When the committee finished this task, the revised
manual, DSM-III, had quadrupled from its previous size, and the list
of disorders grew to over 200 classifications.4" Each disorder listed in
DSM-III included a checklist of precise and "fairly objective" attributes
of the disorder.' 4 The DSM is considered "the bible of mental illness"
and is utilized not only by therapists but also by insurance companies
and judges to identify and define the mentally ill.45
B. Late Luteal Dysphoric Disorder and DSM-III-R
In late 1985, an APA work group convened to create the DSM-III-
R.46 When the plan for this revision was announced, proponents
characterized it as a "technical revision to clear up problems that had
been overlooked in the massive reorganization of the manual in 1980
37. Old Problem, New "Disease": The Controversy Surrounding Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS),
NErwoRK NEws (The National Women's Health Network, Wash., D.C.), Summer 1984, at 5
[hereinafter Old Problem, New "Disease"J.
38. Deborah Franklin, The Politics of Masochism, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1987, at 52.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Herb Kutchins & Stuart A. Kirk, DSM-III-R The Conflict Over New Psychi-
atric Diagnoses, HEALTH & Soc. WoRK, May 1989 at 91, 92 (noting developers of the revised
manual claimed that it was unbiased and more scientific while many critics of DSM-III
claimed that the manual was unfair and prejudiced against women).
41. Franklin, supra note 38, at 52.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. In theory, this attempt at standardization should help health professionals diag-
nose patients in a consistent manner. Id. Problems arise, though, due to the subjective
nature of mental health. Id.
45. Id.; see also supra note 1.
46. Id.
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and to take into account recent research."47 Controversy surrounded
many of the new diagnostic categories proposed for the revised man-
ual.4 s One of the proposed diagnostic categories was late luteal phase
dysphoric disorder (LLPDD)." The APA Work Group coined the
term LLPDD in order to distinguish it from PMS.50 The diagnostic
criteria for LLPDD included psychological disturbances that seriously
interfere with work, ordinary social activities, or relationships."1
These disturbances occur during the luteal phase, the week before the
onset of menses, and end within a few days after the onset of menstru-
ation. 2 LLPDD differed from PMS by "a clear emphasis on mood and
behavioral as opposed to physical symptoms."" In addition, the
LLPDD diagnostic criteria focused on the severity, frequency, and
types of the patient's complaints, the interference with normal func-
tioning, and the need for confirmation over two menstrual cycles.
54
Controversy immediately arose regarding the classification of
LLPDD.5 5 Many felt that the disorder would become a catch-all diag-
nosis used in lieu of more specific, and difficult, determinations.
56
Other critics thought the diagnosis would be stigmatizing and that the
research literature was inadequate.5 Due to these concerns, the
LLPDD classification was not included in the main text of the DSM-
III-R, but inserted into the appendix as a "proposed diagnostic cate-
gory needing further study."
5 1
C. Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder and DSM-IV
On July 9, 1993, when the American Psychiatric Association re-
convened to revise the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 9 Premen-
47. Id. at 92.
48. Id. at 93. Objections were raised regarding "sexual assault disorder," "masochistic
personality disorder," and "PMS." Id.
49. American Psychiatric Association Work Group, DSM-IVLiterature Review; Late Luteal
Phase Dysphoric Disorder [hereinafter DSM-IVLiterature Review] (working paper) (on file with
the American Psychiatric Association).
50. Id. at 4, 75.
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. This is a questionable distinction because previous definitions of "PMS" appear
to be very similar to the new classification. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
55. "A longstanding controversy has existed as to whether PMS is a gynecological or
psychological disorder. The International Classification of Diseases includes a gynecological
diagnosis of premenstrual tension syndrome." Kutchins & Kirk, supra note 40, at 94.
56. DSM-IV Literature Review, supra note 49, at 5.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Span, supra note 3, at Cl.
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strual dysphoric disorder was among the new disorders to be
classified.6° This disorder is essentially the same as LLPDD.61 The
APA organized a working group of six members to discuss and re-
search whether to incorporate the new diagnosis into the DSM-IV.62
The Work Group studied five proposals.63 Option #1 maintained the
status quo, kept the diagnosis in the DSM appendix, and did not in-
clude it within the official text.' Option #2 included the classifica-
tion in the nomenclature.65 Option #3 viewed the condition as
clinically significant, but rather than label it as a mental disorder, in-
cluded it in a section for other significant conditions that may be the
focus of diagnosis or treatment. 66 Option #4 omitted the category
completely.67 And, option #5 listed it as an example of a "Depressive
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified and/or Anxiety Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified."68 The APA ultimately decided to list premen-
strual dysphoric disorder in the main text of DSM-IV as a possible
form of depression, but placed the definitional symptoms in the
appendix.69
D. The Debate Surrounding the Categorization of PMDD
The current controversy surrounding the classification of PMDD
as a mental disorder has many facets. First, many critics say that there
is insufficient empirical research to support the classification.7" For
instance, Sheryle J. Gallant and Jean A. Hamilton conducted a study
60. Id.
61. DSM-1V Literature Review, supra note 49, at 75. The APA decided to change the
name from late luteal phase dysphoric disorder to premenstrual dysphoric disorder for two
reasons. First, LLPDD is a cumbersome name; and second, it is potentially misleading
because the symptoms may not be exclusively related to the endocrine state of the late
luteal phase. Id.; see Appendix, infta.
62. DSM-1V Literature Review, supra note 49, at 6.
63. Id. at 76.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. As of the completion of the Working Copy of the Literature Review, the Work
Group had not completed reviewing the evidence to determine its recommendation.
69. A New Psychological Bible Has Been Created (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, July 11,
1993).
70. PMS Diagnosis Protested, supra note 9, at 5.
[E] normous numbers of studies have been done, but most are profoundly flawed
and certainly do not constitute evidence that there should be such a disorder.
Indeed, the DSM subcommittee studying PMS reached an impasse about whether
or not it should go into the handbook and took the curious step of asking two
other people to review the research and decide what should be done.
[VOL. 54:571
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which used daily ratings to confirm PMS.71 Their study utilized a con-
trol group of women without PMS symptoms and a group of women
with a provisional diagnosis of LLPDD (which uses the same defini-
tional symptoms as PMDD).72 The results of the study indicated that
there was no reliable difference between the two groups of women
based on their daily symptom ratings regardless of the criteria used.73
The two researchers further stressed that the DSM-1V Work Group's
study involved no control groups.74 The APA" has noted in its own
literature that empirical research difficulties exist.75 Feminists argue
that "there is no proof that any such disorder exists and that without
better evidence, no women should be labeled mentally ill."76 Critics
maintain that classifying some women who have mood swings as men-
tally ill will harm all women. A more solid empirical basis is needed.77
Paula Caplan, a University of Toronto psychologist, explains that
both PMS and PMDD may have other societal and interpersonal
causes. 78 For example, upsetting life situations such as abuse in the
family, lack of support, and economic woes can lead to depression
associated with this disorder.79 The depression is aggravated when the
physical symptoms of the premenstrual cycle manifest themselves.80
Because we live in a sexist society, women and men too easily sub-
71. Sheryle J. Gallant &Jean A. Hamilton, Letters to the Editor, 54 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED.
723, 725 (1992).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. Gallant and Hamilton stressed that had the APA Work Group's study included
the use of control groups, they would probably have come to the same result: "that the
proportion of women with a provisional diagnosis who met prospective symptom criteria
was not statistically greater than the proportion of individuals in the various control groups
who met these criteria." Id.
75. DSM-IV Literature Review, supra note 49, at 75. The APA Work Group stated
"IT]here is accumulating, but preliminary, evidence that a disorder meeting the criteria
for LLPDD [the group had not yet decided to change the name to PMDD] as proposed in
the DSM-III-R Appendix does exist . . . . However, there are many methodological
problems in the research to date." Id.
76. Lehman, supra note 35, at 17.
77. Id. Other adverse consequences that have been advanced in opposition to the
classification include: (1) A fear that "[a]rbitrary features of the proposed diagnosis will
prematurely foreclose and bias research in the field" for lack of attention to the issues of
reliability and validity and for the exclusion of physical symptoms; (2) Concern that the
diagnosis only appears to help women clinically because "[t]here is no one proven treat-
ment for the proposed disorder"; (3) The label could be used to discriminate against wo-
men in the workplace. Jean A. Hamilton, Action Alert on Sexism in Psychiatric Diagnoses
(Institute for Research on Women's Health) (on file with the American Psychological
Association).
78. Telephone Interview with Paula Caplan (Oct. 24, 1993).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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scribe to the idea that PMS is the reason for their frustration and de-
pression." These latter problems can be helped by a change of diet
and in self-help groups.82 Mental illness, however, is not normally
cured in this manner, a discrepancy which underscores the argument
that PMDD differs from other mental illnesses.83
A related quandary is the premise that PMS and PMDD are "con-
structs" which can lead to possible misuse. 4 The phrases premen-
strual syndrome and premenstrual dysphoric disorder can have
different meanings depending on the person defining the condi-
tion. 5 The subjective meanings often lead to divergent interpreta-
tions with the result that some women are classified as having a mental
illness while others are not. 6 For some, the term PMS may mean a
debilitating condition, but for others it may mean some physical and
mental discomfort prior to the onset of menstruation. 7 This discrep-
ancy can lead to disastrous results when applied in a scientific arena
and explains why critics believe a more solid foundation of research
should be established prior to formal classification. 8
Protests surrounding PMDD also focus on the classification's so-
cial and political dangers to women.8 9 The APA recognized this risk
when it admitted that classification "might confirm the cultural belief
that menstruation causes disability and makes women less fit for posi-
tions of responsibility."9" Kim Gandy, executive vice president of the
National Organization for Women, stated that this classification
"'gives credibility to an old myth, to an old stereotype"'; she feared
"that women will be called mentally unstable once a month and that
the listing will be used against women who are vying for jobs or child
custody in divorce hearings."91 Moreover, the "diagnosis reifies itself
and becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, partly because of women's in-
ternalized beliefs about menstruation and because the most stigma-
81. Id.
82. Old Problem, New "Disease," supra note 37, at 6.
83. See Span, supra note 3, at C2.
84. Interview with Paula Caplan, supra note 78.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
89. PMS Diagnosis Protested, supra note 9, at 5.
90. DSM-IV Literature Review, supra note 49, at 70.
91. Laura Beil, PMS: Still a Mystery to Doctors, Sufferers; For All Its Infamy, Premenstrual
Syndrome Remains Entangled In Misconceptions, ORLANDO SENnNEL, Aug. 20, 1993, at El.
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tizing aspect-reports of impairment in occupational functioning-are
never subject to external validation."92
Further, "[w] hile it is true... that some medical and psychiatric
conditions are confined by their very nature to one gender or the
other, identifying a menstrually-related psychiatric disorder as a free
standing entity or a special kind of affective disorder raises conceptual
as well as related social problems."93 There is skepticism regarding
the rationale for establishing a psychiatric illness related exclusively to
hormonally linked symptoms found only in women.9" This skepticism
is heightened by the fact that there are no parallel categories for
men.
95
III. THE IMPLICATIONS
A. The Classification Will Lay a More Solid Foundation For PMS as a
Defense
Premenstrual syndrome has already appeared in the legal context
as a defense to criminal liability.96 In France, juries have recognized
PMS as a form of legal insanity9 and in England courts have accepted
PMS as a mitigating factor.98 Although no appellate court in the
United States has ruled on the validity of the premenstrual syndrome
defense, it has appeared in trial courts with varying degrees of suc-
cess.99 The APA's classification of premenstrual dysphoric disorder as
a "mental disorder" will further substantiate the PMS defense and lead
to the increased use of the syndrome in criminal cases in the United
States.
92. Hamilton, supra note 77 (internal citations omitted). Hamilton explains that label-
ing menstruation a mental disorder reinforces the belief that women are defective because
of their innate physiology. Such a negative stereotype will be internalized by women and
adversely affect their self-esteem, attitudes, menstruation, and their bodies. Id.
93. DSM-IV Literature Review, supra note 49, at 68.
94. Id. at 68.
95. PMS Diagnosis Protested, supra note 9, at 5. "There is no parallel category for men,
no suggestion that the well-documented mood and behavior changes that result from varia-
tions in 'male hormone' changes should be given the label of a mental illness (no 'testos-
terone-based' aggressive disorder)." Id
96. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
97. Howard L. Oleck, Legal Aspects of Premenstrual Tension, 166 INT'L REc. OF MED. &
GEN. PRAc. CuNics 492, 496 (1953).
98. See infra notes 107, 111 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 126, 141, 145.
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1. Current State of the Law.-Defendants have introduced PMS as
a defense in Europe, Canada,10 and the United States. In England,
PMS is accepted as a mitigating factor in criminal cases. In the 1980
case of Regina v. Craddock,1 1 Sandie Craddock was arrested for stab-
bing a fellow barmaid to death.10 ' At trial, her murder charge was
reduced to manslaughter and Craddock was released on probation
after her attorney pleaded that she suffered from premenstrual syn-
drome.0 3 Craddock had more than thirty prior convictions, mainly
for criminal damage and assault, and had attempted suicide on multi-
ple occasions. 1 04 Upon reviewing diaries that Craddock had main-
tained over the years, her attorney discovered that each criminal
offense or suicide attempt occurred at approximately the same time in
her menstrual cycle."0 5 Dr. Katharina Dalton, the defense's expert
witness, diagnosed Craddock as suffering from premenstrual syn-
drome, and prescribed progesterone treatment. 0 6 The medication
stabilized Craddock's personality and she received probation contin-
gent on continuance of her treatment.1
°7
Craddock reappeared in court in 1982, under the name of
Sandie Smith. 0 ' Smith was charged with two counts of threatening to
kill a police officer, and one count of carrying a weapon." 9 Dr. Dal-
ton testified that she had been progressively reducing Smith's medica-
tion when the offense occurred.' Smith was found guilty on all
counts, but the trial court again recognized PMS as a mitigating factor
and sentenced her to probation.'
100. James W. Lewis, Premenstrual Syndrome as a Criminal Defense, 19 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 425, 426 (1990). In Alberta, Canada, a woman accused of shoplifting asserted a
premenstrual syndrome defense and was acquitted. The judge opined that at the time of
the criminal offense, the defendant was irrational and not capable of forming the requisite
intent to steal. Id.
101. 1 C.L. 49 (1980).
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also Tybor, supra note 5, at 1.
104. Craddock, 1 C.L. at 49.
105. Carney & Williams, supra note 19, at 258-59.
106. Id. at 259; see supra note 27.
107. Id. at 259.
108. Regina v. Smith, No. 1/A/82 (C.A. Crim. Div. Apr. 27, 1982) (LEXIS, Enggen li-
brary case file) at *14. By the time of this trial, Craddock/Smith had already accumulated
45 convictions for which she had appeared in court on 28 different occasions. Many of the
charges against her had involved inexplicable violent behavior. Id. at *15.
109. Id. at *14.
110. Id. at *15. Dr. Dalton had reduced Smith's dosage in order to see whether Smith
could carry on a normal life without the massive progesterone treatment. Id.
111. Id. at *15-16. During her testimony, Dr. Dalton was asked whether Smith "would
have done what she did, knowing what she was doing?" Id. at *15. Dr. Dalton answered
that, "She knew what she was doing, but she could not control herself. She lost her moral
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The British Court of Appeals for the Criminal Division held that
the appropriate application of a PMS defense was as a mitigating fac-
tor rather than a substantive defense." 2 The appellate court rea-
soned that
[p]rimarily, the function of the criminal law is to protect so-
ciety and if one asks oneself what would the consequences
[be] if we acceded to [the defense attorney's] submission [to
acquit], one would find this picture. After she had stabbed
the barmaid to death, the Appellant would be entitled to
come before the court and seek an acquittal because she
would properly be able to say that as a result of the lack of
the necessary hormone, she lost control of herself and that
she is not morally guilty. As a result of that, she would be
acquitted and discharged with all the consequent risks to so-
ciety. There would be no control over her by society through the
courts and she would continue to be a danger to all around her.
That would be a totally unacceptable state of affairs." 3
Admitting the serious nature of the offense, the court of criminal ap-
peals nonetheless concluded that the lower court had wide discretion
with respect to sentencing and could impose probation."
4
In another British case, Regina v. English,"5 a trial court accepted
PMS as a mitigating factor. Christine English had deliberately pinned
her boyfriend to a pole with her car and killed him." 6 Dr. Dalton
testified at this trial and diagnosed English as suffering from "an ex-
tremely aggravated form of premenstrual physical condition."117 The
court reduced the murder charge to "manslaughter due to dimin-
safeguards." Id. The trial court did not allow the jury to consider the defense of automa-
tism and therefore the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Id. at *16. The court defined
automatism "as connoting the state of a person who, though capable of action, is not con-
scious of what he is doing .... It means unconscious involuntary action and it is a defence
because the mind does not go with what is being done." Id. (quoting Bratty v. Attorney
Gen. N. Ir., 46 Crim. App. 1, 28 (1962)).
The Smith court believed, "It is quite clear from the doctor's evidence that this woman
knew exactly what she was doing, intended to do it, but was led into doing it because the
dark side of her nature appeared .... ." Id. at *16. The type of conduct that the court
described more closely mimics actions consistent with the defense of "irresistible impulse."
Id. at *17. But this defense is not available in England, and the court was not willing to
examine this area of law. Id. at *17-18.
112. Id. at *18.
113. Id. at *17 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at *17-18.
115. Tybor, supra note 5, at 1, 12 (citing Regina v. English (Norwich Crown Ct. Nov. 10,
1981) (unreported)).
116. Carney & Williams, supra note 19, at 261.
117. Id.
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ished responsibility" and stated that English acted under exceptional
circumstances."
8
Finally, in Regina v. Reynolds, 19 the Court of Appeals for the
Criminal Division reduced a conviction and life sentence for murder
to manslaughter and supervised probation. 2 ° Reynolds had killed
her mother by hitting her on the head with a hammer. 121 On appeal,
Dr. Katharina Dalton testified that "this was a case of diminished re-
sponsibility, the cause of that being a conjunction of premenstrual
syndrome and postnatal depression."122 After hearing Dr. Dalton's
testimony, the prosecuting attorney stated that if there were a retrial
he would accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter based on diminished
capacity. 12  With the prosecutor's concession and on medical evi-
dence that the appellant suffered from diminished responsibility, the
court substituted a verdict of manslaughter.1 2 4  The court then
stepped beyond British precedent and explicitly accepted premen-
strual syndrome as fitting within the defense of diminished
capacity. 125
The first American case to offer premenstrual syndrome as a de-
fense occurred in April 1982 in People v. Santos.1 26 Charged with as-
sault of her child, Shirley Santos argued that she suffered from
premenstrual syndrome at the time of the offense.'2 7 Santos' attorney
entered a plea of not guilty on the grounds that Santos had PMS. 128
The attorney described PMS as "a 'distinctive' and 'separate' entity
belonging to... the specific category of genitourinary and/or endo-
crine reactions." 129 This defense was never tested in the court, how-
118. Id.
119. Crim. L.R. 679 (C.) (1988) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file).
120. Id. at *14-15.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *10.
123. Id. at *11.
124. Id. at *12, *15. In terms of sentencing, the court stated,
[T] here clearly was a degree of responsibility which still remained and which calls
for the imposition of the appropriate sentence. However, as we have said she has
already served a substantial period in custody. We feel that the interests ofjustice,
as well as the interests of the appellant herself, who is not yet 20 and therefore
very young, would be served by placing her on probation with a condition of
psychiatric supervision ....
Id. at *15.
125. Lewis, supra note 100, at 431-32. A plea of diminished capacity is not a complete
excuse to criminal behavior but operates to reduce the severity of a charge to a lesser
offense. See infra note 172.
126. No. 1K046229 (Crim. Ct. Kings County Nov. 3, 1982) (unpublished opinion).
127. Chait, supra note 10, at 269 (citing Santos, No. 1K046229).
128. Id,
129. Id. (quoting Santos, No. 1K046229).
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ever, because the parties subsequently negotiated a plea bargain.130
Brooklyn's District Attorney, Elizabeth Holtzman, agreed to drop all
felony charges against Santos in return for a guilty plea to a charge of
harassment.15 ' Holtzman claimed this negotiation was not based on
the merit of a PMS defense. 1 2 The defense attorney, Stephanie Ben-
son, strongly disagreed, stating: "I never expressed any doubt as to
the viability of PMS as a defense. I advised my client to do the most
sensible possible thing.... Precedents may be important, but my cli-
ent's best interest remains paramount."1 33 Although Santos ended in
a plea bargain, commentators take note of it because the judge agreed
to hear PMS testimony to support a defense, even if only in the pre-
trial stage of the litigation."'
In 1983, the courts faced the validity of a PMS defense in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. In Lovato v. Irvin, '3 Jamie Lynn Irvin stabbed her
lover, Betty Ann Lovato, in the back and across the chest with a steak
knife.' 36 In addition to the criminal charges, Lovato filed a civil suit
seeking compensation for her injuries.'3 7 The parties settled in the
amount of $5,200.00.138 Shortly thereafter, Irvin filed a petition in
bankruptcy, seeking discharge of all debts including the money owed
to Lovato. l3 9 Lovato sought to have her judgment excepted from the
discharge under Title 11, section 523 of the United States Code, be-
cause Irvin's conduct was a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor
to another .... "14 o Irvin contended that her conduct was not willful
but the result of uncontrollable conduct due to premenstrual
syndrome.' 4 '
130. Id. at 271.
131. Id,
132. Elizabeth Holtzman, Letter to the Editor, Premenstrual Symptoms: No Legal Defense,
60 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 712, 713-14 (1986). Holtzman stated that her office did extensive
research on PMS in their preparation of the Santos case. They reviewed 3000 medical
publications, interviewed gynecologists, psychiatrists, and endocrinologists. Id. at 712.
Holtzman stated that this research showed there is no "single well-defined medical condi-
tion which can be called 'premenstrual syndrome.'" Id. at 712-13. She further noted that
there was no scientific evidence that supported the determination that the onset of the
menstrual cycle prompts aggressive or violent behavior. Id. at 713.
133. Stephanie Benson, Letter to the Editor, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 29, 1982, at 14.
134. Richard T. Oakes, PMS: A Plea Bargain In Brooklyn Does Not a Rule of Law Make, 9
HAMLINE L. REv. 203, 205 (1986).
135. 31 B.R. 251 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
136. Id. at 253.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 254.
139. Id.
140. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (6).
141. Irvin, 31 B.R. at 254. "Irvin testified that she had begun menstruating on April 27,
1979 [the date of the attack], that she was suffering from cramps and pain, was confused
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The Irvin court found the scientific evidence relating to PMS in-
conclusive and ruled that it could not be accepted as an explanation
for otherwise willful and malicious conduct.1 42 In order for premen-
strual syndrome to be accepted as a defense, the Irvin court required
that two conditions be met. "First, the premise upon which any such
scientific theory is based must have achieved general acceptance in
the medical community; and secondly, there must be evidence that, to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the conduct was proximately
caused by the medical disorder." 4 ' While rejecting the PMS defense
in this case, the court recognized that "[t] here may well be a circum-
stance in the future where sufficient [scientific evidence] establishes
premenstrual syndrome as a legitimate defense to criminal or tortious
conduct committed by an unfortunate sufferer from this medical
difficulty."' 44
In June 1991, a Virginia court accepted America's first successful
criminal defense based on PMS.' 45 While driving home from a
friend's house, Geraldine Richter was stopped by police officers for
straddling the white broken line.'46 The results of a breathalyzer test
suggested that she was legally intoxicated. 47 Richter's attorney suc-
cessfully used a two-pronged defense, bringing in experts to testify
that PMS adversely affected Richter's conduct and, alternatively, that
the breathalyzer test was inaccurate.' 4 Using PMS as a mitigating fac-
and frightened, that she couldn't think, and that as the events unfolded it was as if 'some-
one else took over' her body .... She attributes all of her bizarre conduct during the
period surrounding April 27, 1979, to suffering from premenstrual syndrome." Id.
142. Id. at 259. The court relied on testimony by clinical psychologist Dr. LaFleur who
stated that "the theory of PMS is very new in the medical profession, it is highly controver-
sial and there is little literature on the subject." Id. The court also noted Dr. David
Muller's statement that "the DSM-III, relied upon by psychiatrists in the diagnosis of psy-
chiatric disorders, doesn't even recognize PMS as a mental problem." Id
143. Id..
144. Id. at 261-62.
145. Martin Kasindorf, Allowing Hormones to Take the Rap; Does the PMS Defense Help or
Hinder Women?, NEwSDAY, June 16, 1991, at 17. Several courts, nevertheless, have rejected
the PMS defense. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grass, 595 A.2d 789, 792 (1991) (holding
defendant failed to show that PMS rendered her incapable of making a knowing and con-
scious refusal to take a breathalyzer test).
146. DeNeen L. Brown, PMS Defense Successful in Va. Drunken Driving Case, WASH. POST,
June 7, 1991, at Al. After stopping Richter, the police officer noticed a strong odor of
alcohol. Id. Richter refused to take field sobriety tests, tried to kick the officer in the
groin, used offensive language, and threatened the officer by saying, "You son of a [exple-
tive]; you [expletive] can't do this to me; I'm a doctor. I hope you [expletive] get shot
and come to my hospital so I can refuse to treat you ... ." Id.
147. Id. Geraldine Richter's breath test registered at a 0.13. The legal limit in Virginia
is 0.10. Id.
148. Id. One witness testified that PMS affects some women's behavior, another testified
that the breathalyzer reading was skewed. Id.
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tor, the defense posited that, because PMS causes some to become
irritable and hostile, it was a reasonable explanation for Richter's
behavior. 149
The Richter case was controversial. Proponents of the PMS de-
fense argue "' [i]t's fair that PMS should be admissible in a court of
law, because.., for many women there's nothing they can do to con-
trol it.'"'5 0 Opponents believe "the case sounds like what I'm scared
of-the use of a psychiatric diagnosis to excuse inexcusable behav-
ior."15' This controversy parallels the opposing sides taken in the
premenstrual dysphoric disorder battle. The debate centers on the
need to diagnose and treat the severe premenstrual symptoms that
affect some women, but also to recognize the risk that a PMS defense
will inevitably produce negative stereotypes, myths, and repercussions
affecting all women.
2. Problems with the PMS Defense.--Critics cite many legal obsta-
cles that effectively invalidate a PMS defense. Some note it would be
difficult to obtain the required proof due to the subjective nature of
the syndrome.152 Others cite evidentiary and definitional problems
with respect to an insanity plea.' These concerns were valid prior to
adoption of the PMDD diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual IV but have since lost some of their authority.
a. Insanity Defense.-Common to all recognized versions of
the insanity defense 5 4 are two basic requirements. The defendant
must prove (1) that she suffers from a mental disease or defect, and
(2) that there is a causal nexus between the disease and the criminal
action.' 55 Before adopting the PMDD classification, these elements
were difficult to achieve in a PMS defense because many researchers
thought PMS was a physiological problem, not a disease of the
mind. 15 6
149. Id.
150. Kasindorf, supra note 145, at 17 (quoting Gloria Allred, a California attorney active
in women's legal issues).
151. Id. (quoting Dr. Nada Stodand, a University of Chicago psychiatrist and chairper-
son for an American Psychiatric Association study that considered whether severe PMS
should be listed as a mental illness).
152. See infra note 158.
153. See infra notes 156, 160.
154. Versions of the insanity defense include the M'Naghten test, the irresistible impulse
test, the product test, and the substantial capacity test. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
Scorr, SuBsTANTrvE CRIMINAL LAw § 4.2 (1986).
155. Id.
156. Lewis, supra note 100, at 430; see also Carney & Williams, supra note 19, at 264
("PMS is not a disease or defect of the mind, .. ."); Lillian Apodaca & Lori Fink, Note,
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The M'Naghten rule is the prevailing standard for insanity de-
fenses in the criminal context.157 Under the M'Naghten test a defend-
ant cannot be convicted of a crime if,
at the time [she] committed the act, [she] was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act [she] was do-
ing; or, if [she] did know it, as not to know [she] was doing
what was wrong.158
It is not clear what type of mental disease or defect is required to be a
"disease of the mind" under the M'Naghten test, but "it would seem
that any mental abnormality, be it psychosis, neurosis, organic brain
disorder, or cognitive intellectual deficiency will suffice if it has caused
the consequences described in the second part of the test.
" 159
Prior to adoption of the PMDD classification there were two rea-
sons why a person suffering from premenstrual syndrome would not
qualify as "insane" under the M'Naghten test. First, PMS was not con-
sidered a disease of the mind, but rather, it was believed to be a prob-
lem associated with a hormonal disorder.'" Second, even if it were
considered a mental disease, research established that cognitive abili-
ties were not impaired by the menstrual cycle.' 6 ' Katharina Dalton
and Lawrence Taylor stated that "a hormonal aberration such as PMS
does not seem to affect individual's ability to appreciate the 'nature
Criminal Law: Premenstrual Syndrome and the Courts, 24 W.sHmuRN L.J. 54 (1984) (stating a
hormonal disorder cannot be a mental disease or defect).
157. 1 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 154, § 4.2. Sometimes called the right-wrong test,
the M'Naghten rule prevails in a majority ofjurisdictions, but a substantial minority reject
M'Naghten, usually in favor of the Model Penal Code's substantial capacity test. Id.; see also
infra note 176.
158. Id. at 304.
159. Id. at 312 (emphasis in original). In order to satisfy the second part of the test, the
defect must affect the defendant's ability to understand the nature and quality of the act or
that the act was wrong. Id.
160. See Taylor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 271 ("The premenstrual syndrome is a hor-
mone deficiency disease."); see also Reid & Yen, supra note 29, at 86. "Although to date the
pathogenesis of this disorder remains speculative, the weight of evidence supports the
premise that PMS is related to an aberration in the cyclic function of the hypothalamic-
pituitary-ovarian axis." Id.
161. Sharon Golub, The Effect of Premenstrual Anxiety and Depression on Cognitive Function,
34 J. PERSONALTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 99, 103 (1976). To analyze the cognitive function of
women during their menstrual cycle, fifty women between the ages of thirty and forty-five
were placed in groups matched by similar age and life situations. Id. at 100. The two
groups were tested for anxiety, depression and cognition-one group was tested premen-
strually, and the other intermenstrually. Id. at 100-01. The tests measured sensory-percep-
tive factors, memory, problem solving, induction, concept formation and creativity. Id at
101. The study found there were changes with respect to depression and anxiety, but
mood changes had no effect on the cognitive test performance. Id. at 101-03.
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and quality' of criminal conduct, or to understand whether it is right
or wrong. Rather, the ability to control one's behavior is affected. " 162
In jurisdictions that follow the M'Naghten rule, PMS sufferers would
consequently lack an effective defense based on their symptoms.
On the other hand, jurisdictions that use the "substantial capacity
test" of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code'63 will more
likely accept a PMS defense because a total impairment of capacity is
not necessary.' 64 Under the Model Penal Code, "[a] person is not re-
sponsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a re-
sult of the mental disease or defect [she] lacks substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of [her] conduct or to con-
form [her] conduct to the requirements of law."' 65 Under this test,
the proximate causation obstacle is less problematic, but the idea that
premenstrual syndrome is not a mental disease or defect still persists
as an impediment.'66
Regardless of the test used, public policy and legislative history
create a presumption that all women are sane and discourage the in-
sanity defense. For example, the United States Department of Justice
takes the position that "Congress intended to exclude mental or emo-
tional processes which impair behavioral controls. Indeed, it appears
that all disorders, short of psychotic behavior167 are excluded from
the insanity defense in federal court." " Additionally, both Congress
and state legislatures have enacted provisions which create stringent
evidentiary standards that must be overcome in order to establish the
insanity defense.1 6 9 These changes narrow the scope of the insanity
162. Taylor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 279.
163. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).
164. Taylor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 280. "[Tlhe woman suffering from a premen-
strual condition which can be shown to strongly inhibit her capacity to control anti-social
acts would arguably have a complete defense." Id.
165. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).
166. Taylor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 280.
167. See Marc P. Press, Premenstrual Stress Syndrome as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 1983
DuKE L. REv. 176, 177 n.14. Psychosis is typically defined as
profound, sweeping mental disorders characterized by partial or total loss of con-
tact with or distortion of reality. Also characteristic are severe disturbances of
perception, thought processes, feelings and behavior, retreat from or perversion
of social relationships, and often a disintegration of the personality structure,
leading to the release of processes which ordinarily operate only unconsciously.
Id.; see generally M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAw § 2.1, at 23 (2d
ed. 1982).
168. Oakes, supra note 134, at 211 (citations omitted).
169. Id. In federal court, a defendant must prove an insanity defense by clear and con-
vincing evidence. See also Chait, supra note 10, at 287 (noting state legislatures have en-
acted standards which require defendants to rebut by a preponderance of the evidence the
presumption that every person is sane).
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plea and make it difficult, if not impossible to assert PMS as a
defense.1 70
The "diminished capacity defense" 171 is a more realistic use of
premenstrual syndrome in criminal trials than an insanity defense.
171
Persons use diminished capacity defenses when they are ineligible for
a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, but where their mental
abnormality may be a relevant and important consideration in the de-
termination of whether they are guilty of the alleged crime.173 This
defense is not a complete excuse but serves to obtain a reduction in
the severity of the crime charged. 174 In order to prove diminished
capacity, the defendant must produce expert testimony and evidence
on her mental condition in order to determine whether she had the
requisite mens rea for the crime charged.1 7 ' The use of this defense is
also limited to the minority of jurisdictions which have approved the
doctrine.
176
b. Factual and Evidentiary Problems. -Before a defendant can
prove that she suffered from premenstrual syndrome, a common defi-
nition for the disorder is needed. Prior to the adoption of the PMDD
classification, and arguably continuing after, PMS was an ill-defined
phenomenon with many divergent opinions regarding its causes,
symptomology, cures, 1 77 and prevalence within various segments of
170. Oakes, supra note 134, at 211.
171. 1 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 154, § 4.7. This doctrine is also referred to as "par-
tial responsibility" and "partial insanity." Id.
172. Lewis, supra note 100, at 432. Some PMS symptoms, such as hypoglycemia, are
comparable to ailments that are successfully used under a partial responsibility defense.
See Chait, supra note 10, at 270 n.41. In People v. White, No. 98663 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F.
Cty. 1979) (unreported), the defendant was allowed to plead diminished capacity due to
hypoglycemia-the "twinkie defense." See also Ruth Macklin, The Premenstrual Syndrome
(PMS) Labe" Benefit or Burden, in PREMENSrRUAL SYNDROME 17, 23 (Benson E. Ginsberg &
Bonnie Frank Carter eds., 1987). Macklin believes that PMS and XYY chromosomal abnor-
malities are similar because "[i]n both instances, it is suggested that finding a biological
cause to antisocial or aggressive behavior can mitigate the individual's moral responsibility
for that behavior." Id.
173. 1 LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 154, § 4.7.
174. Lewis, supra note 100, at 431-32.
175. 1 LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 154, at § 4.7; see also Apodaca & Fink, supra note 156,
at 73.
176. LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 154, § 4.7, at 522 n.2. As of 1986, fewer than 25 states
had approved the diminished capacity doctrine, and subsequent case law suggests that its
acceptance is on the wane. Id.
177. Carney & Williams, supra note 19, at 256-57.
Because the etiology of PMS is unclear, the efficacy of any treatment is neither
fully understood nor universally accepted. Researchers have conducted several
studies to find the ideal treatment, but these studies are inconclusive, due partly
to difficulties in evaluating the wide range of PMS symptoms. Moreover, most
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the population.""8 It is, therefore, difficult for a defendant to provide
the necessary factual basis for a PMS defense. 79
The lack of an agreed working definition of PMS also creates sub-
stantial evidentiary obstacles that must be overcome in order to suc-
cessfully plead a scientific defense.' 80 When a jury evaluates issues
beyond the knowledge of the average layperson, the use of expert tes-
timony is both proper and helpful for the deliberation."' In a crimi-
nal trial, expert medical testimony on premenstrual syndrome will
generally be required because the average layperson will probably not
understand the defendant's testimony nor attach proper weight to
it.'8 2 Therefore, the court's decision regarding the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony will essentially determine whether the defendant will
be able to establish a cogent defense.'8 3
The admissibility of scientific expert testimony depends on
whether the trial is conducted in federal or state court. The two stan-
dards that are most often applied in state courts are the "relevance
test" and the "Frye test."'8 4 In federal courts, the universal standard
followed is codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 5
studies have lacked sufficient control and rigor to allow for meaningful interpre-
tation of the results.
1d.
178. Kay A. Heggestad, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Case Against Using Premenstrual Syn-
drome as a Defense in a Court of Law, 9 HAMtUNE L. REV. 155, 156 (1986). There is wide
variation in the estimates of the prevalence of PMS among the population. Some studies
state that at least 95% of menstruating women suffer from some symptoms, with 20 to 40%
of these women suffering from severe PMS that negatively affects their lives. Id. Other
studies state that only 10, 5, or 2% suffer from extreme symptoms. Id. These estimates vary
according to how the researcher defines the syndrome. Id.
179. Lewis, supra note 100, at 429.
180. Id.
181. SeeJOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13 (1992) [hereinafter Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
To warrant the use of expert testimony two general elements are required. First,
some courts state that the subject of inference must be so distinctively related to
some science [or] profession.., as to be beyond the ken of laymen .... Other
cases will admit expert opinion concerning matters about which the jurors may
have general knowledge if the expert opinion would still aid their understanding
of the fact issue.
Id.
182. Press, supra note 167, at 178. A layperson's definition of PMS is probably very dif-
ferent from the symptoms related to severe premenstrual syndrome, suffered by a minority
of women. Id.
183. Id.
184. See infra notes 186-196 and accompanying text.
185. FED. R. Evm. 702. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not Fiye, provide the
standard for the admission of expert scientific testimony in a federal proceeding. Id. at
2793.
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3. State Courts.--"In the jurisdictions that follow Frye, the propo-
nent of the evidence must prove general acceptance, by surveying sci-
entific publications, judicial decisions, or practical applications, or by
presenting testimony from scientists as to the attitudes of their fellow
scientists."' 86 Scientific evidence relating to premenstrual syndrome
will come within the ambit of the "general acceptance" standard if the
court can first define the relevant scientific community, then define
the scientific concept that the community should embrace, and finally
determine whether the community accepts or rejects the concept. 87
Prior to DSM-IV, it was unlikely that these three criteria could be
met because medical literature suggested the recognition and diagno-
sis of PMS had not gained general acceptance within the medical com-
munity."1 Further, there was uncertainty as to which scientific
community was the appropriate forum because the syndrome could
fall into more than one medical field.' 9 Psychiatry, gynecology, en-
docrinology and neurology were all possibilities because PMS relates
to both psychological and physiological aspects of the body.'9 '
Admission of expert testimony relating to PMS would be easier to
admit in jurisdictions that do not follow Frye.t9' In these jurisdictions,
the applicable test is relevancy. 192 Expert testimony is considered ad-
missible when it is proven relevant, absent compelling reasons for its
exclusion. 9 ' The evidence is considered relevant if it tends to make
the existence of any determinable fact more or less probable.' 94 This
approach requires a balancing test in which the court must weigh the
relevance of the evidence against its unfair prejudicial effect.195
186. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 203 at 363.
187. Press, supra note 167, at 185-86.
188. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
Many legal commentators have stated that PMS cannot be asserted as a defense
because the scientific community does not generally agree on its existence, its
cause, or its treatment: it is too vague, too general, all women suffer from it, and
if allowed it will be asserted as a blanket defense to all criminal behavior by
women.
Lewis, supra note 100, at 428.
189. Press, supra note 167, at 186.
190. Id.
191. Lewis, supra note 100, at 429-30. Although in the last 20 years the Frye standard has
been severely criticized, limited, modified, rejected, or ignored, it remains the majority
approach. Id.
192. Id. at 430. The relevancy test is considered the minority approach and was devel-
oped by Professor McCormick. Press, supra note 167, at 180.
193. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Compelling reasons for exclusion of testimony include dan-
ger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, potential to mislead the jury, considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id.
194. Press, supra note 167, at 193; compare FED. R. Evm. 401.
195. Press, supra note 167, at 193.
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Under this test, the evidentiary complications associated with a PMS
defense would ,decrease.
19 6
4. Federal Courts.-The Supreme Court recently resolved the evi-
dentiary standard for federal courts in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.197 The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence de-
termine the proper standard for admitting expert testimony.1 98 Spe-
cifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: "[i]f scientific ...
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert .. .may
testify." 99 The Court further explained that nothing in the rule or its
history established "general acceptance" as a prerequisite to
admissibility.2° °
Although the Court endorsed a more liberal rule, limitations re-
main in place to ensure that the testimony is reliable and relevant.21
The trial judge must preliminarily assess "whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ...
whether the reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue."20 2 This requirement is more flexible than the Fye test
and is intended to create a more permissive standard. The Daubert
decision, along with the new PMDD classification, will create a more
favorable evidentiary environment for defenses based on premen-
strual symptoms, which will inevitably lead to an increased use of the
PMS defense in federal trials.
5. DSM-IV Classification of PMDD's Effect with Respect to the Use of a
PMS Defense.-Prior to the PMDD classification in the DSM-IV, there
was much skepticism toward the PMS defense. The biggest obstacle
was that PMS was not a "generally accepted" mental defect or dis-
196. Id. A relevancy standard for admission of expert testimony would permit medical
evidence regarding PMS because it would be relevant to prove that a defendant was suffer-
ing from a mental condition and, therefore, the defendant could not form the requisite
mens rea to commit a crime. Id. In this instance, the court could only exclude evidence if
its relevancy was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, etc. Id.; see supra note
193 and accompanying text.
197. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
198. Id. at 2793. Prior to Daubert, the circuits were sharply divided as to whether the
Federal Rules or Frye applied.
199. FED. R. EVID. 702.
200. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
201. Id. at 2786. The Court stated that "[t]he subject of an expert's testimony must be
scientific... knowledge.' The adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods
and procedures of science." Id.
202. Id. at 2796.
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ease."' 3 The fact that it was not so defined led directly to evidentiary
and substantive difficulties.2 °4 Additionally, courts were apprehensive
about using this syndrome as a defense due to the potentially large
number of women who could use PMS as an excuse for irrational and
inexcusable behavior.20 5
Current research surrounding the classification, however, sug-
gests that only an insignificant proportion of women suffer from
PMDD (approximately two to five percent), substantially less than that
reported in prior PMS research. 2 6 Because insanity defenses are in-
tended for exceptional cases, this narrowing of the percentage of wo-
men who suffer from PMDD places the PMS defense in a position
comparable to other illnesses which fall within the insanity classifica-
tion.20 7 This circumstance may reverse the negative view of courts and
critics toward the use of a PMS defense.
Another impediment to the PMS defense was the belief in many
courts that a "mental disease" must be a chronic, permanent disease
and not temporary.208 A defendant who suffers from premenstrual
syndrome experiences episodes only prior to menstruation. 20 9 Be-
cause PMS is episodic, however, does not mean that it is temporary.
210
The PMDD classification supports the theory that it is a regularly oc-
curring episodic mental impairment.
211
The classification eliminates a major obstacle that once impeded
the use of PMS as a defense in relation to any insanity defense because
all insanity defenses require a mental defect or disease. 12 Prior to the
DSM classification, a prosecutor could easily establish that PMS was a
physiological ailment, not a mental defect, and questions of the de-
gree of mental impairment would never arise. With the PMDD classi-
fication, the defendants need not argue that PMDD is a disease, but
203. Carney & Williams, supra note 19, at 264. Prior to this classification, "the medical
profession's inability to arrive at universally accepted theories on the definition, cause, and
treatment of the premenstrual syndrome... impeded unanimous recognition of PMS by
the legal profession." Id. at 267.
204. Id.
205. Id. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Heggestad, supra note 178, at
160.
206. See DSM-IV Literature Review, supra note 49.
207. See Christopher Boorse, Premenstrual Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility, in PREMEN-
STRUAL SYNDROME 81, 88 (Benson E. Ginsberg & Bonnie Frank Carter eds., 1984).
208. ABRAHAM S. GoLDsTEIN, THE INSANrlY DEFENSE 3 (1967).
209. Apodaca & Fink, supra note 156, at 68-69.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 68.
212. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
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only that the disease affected the individual to a substantial degree
and inhibited certain functions.213
The difficulty of the defendant's task depends on the test applied
in the jurisdiction. In jurisdictions that use the M'Naghten test, the
PMS defense faces a difficult time.214 For the substantial capacity test,
however, "a [defendant] is not responsible for criminal conduct if, as
a result of [her] mental disease or defect... [she] lacks substantial
capacity ... to conform [her] conduct to the requirements of law."215
Arguably, the symptoms related to PMDD fit well within the structure
of this test. Some of the PMDD symptoms include markedly de-
pressed mood, marked anxiety, persistent or marked anger, and a sub-
jective sense of being out of control.2 6 These symptoms show a
reduction of the premenstrual woman's self control, which can lead to
behavior incompatible with the law.2 17
The substantial capacity test is a vague standard21 and reflects a
departure from the belief that a complete impairment of cognitive
capacity and self control is necessary for an insanity defense. 219 For
these reasons, a PMS sufferer can successfully utilize an insanity de-
fense in the aftermath of the DSM-IV classification in those jurisdic-
tions that recognize the substantial capacity test. Likewise, under the
Durham "product" test, the accused is not criminally responsible if the
unlawful act was the product of the mental disease or mental de-
fect.220 The term "product" in this rule is a "but-for" test for causa-
tion.2 Once PMDD is classified as a mental disorder, the attorney's
burden is reduced substantially. Furthermore, if sufficient evidence is
not available to prove a complete insanity defense, the PMDD classifi-
cation creates strong support for a diminished capacity defense.222
Because a diminished capacity defense requires expert testimony for
its proof, the PMDD classification is important.
Other evidentiary difficulties surrounding the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony regarding PMS are similarly relaxed. For example,
213. Taylor & Dalton, supra note 6, at 279.
214. See supra note 158 and accompanying text for a recitation of the M'Naghten test.
215. 1 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 154, § 4.3, at 454-55.
216. Katharina Dalton, Premenstrual Syndrome, 9 HAMtUNE L. REV. 143, 152 (1986).
217. Id.
218. "The [Model Penal Code] draftsmen acknowledged that the word 'substantial' im-
putes no specific measure of degree, but concluded that identifying the degree of impair-
ment with precision was 'impossible both verbally and logically.'" LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra
note 154, § 4.3, at 464.
219. Id.
220. Id. § 4.3.
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 171-176 and accompanying text.
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under the Frye doctrine, an admissible scientific concept must be gen-
erally accepted by the medical community. But, it remains necessary
to define both the terms "general acceptance" and "scientific commu-
nity." The proportion of experts on PMDD who must accept the tech-
nique has never been clearly identified. 223 Most courts do not require
unanimity, but seem to require a substantial majority.224 For PMS, the
scope of the community can be argued to encompass specialists in
mental disorders, as well as the biomedical fields of endocrinology
and gynecology. For an insanity defense, though, only the mental, or
emotional symptoms of premenstrual syndrome are significant. The
new PMDD classification, which stresses behavioral, not somatic ef-
fects, necessarily narrows the field of practitioners who must accept
the syndrome and increases the possibility of general acceptance
under the Fye standard.
Critics previously argued that acceptance could not be
achieved. 2 5 Many cited the fact that premenstrual syndrome was not
contained in the DSM as support for their disapproving conclusion. 26
But the inclusion of PMDD in the recent publication of DSM-IV auto-
matically creates a strong argument in favor of general acceptance
and will lead to greater recognition in the future due to the Manual's
reputation within the mental health profession.
In jurisdictions that utilize Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or the
relevancy standard for the admissibility of evidence, the PMDD classi-
fication will lend substantial weight to an expert's testimony that such
a syndrome exists. This will strengthen attorneys' arguments that
there is a causal link between a particular crime and a premenstrual
"attack," leading to a greater use of the PMS defense.
B. Broader Societal Effects
Although a strengthened PMS defense may be a positive develop-
ment for the few women who suffer from the syndrome, the broader
societal implications may be devastating. 227 In essence, the PMDD
classification and the use of a PMS defense could lead to erosion of
gender equality by reinforcing the myths that women are violent, irra-
223. Boorse, supra note 207, at 114.
224. Id. at 114-15; see, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 396, 391 A.2d 364, 376 (1978).
225. See Lovato v. Irvin, 31 B.R., 251, 256 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); Oakes, supra note 134,
at 216-17.
226. See Lovato, 31 B.R. at 256.
227. While the societal effects of the PMDD classification should be noted, a detailed
discussion of the discriminatory impact is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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tional and not responsible for approximately one week out of every
month. "For millennia, women have been treated as lesser beings,
partly because of their menstrual cycles. Women must be wary of any
theory which fuels the public perception that women go crazy every
month."2" 8 Further, the PMS defense could increase the stereotypical
view that all women are inferior and not responsible for their actions.
The idea that women may act "less responsibly" during premen-
struation can be used to discredit women in the workplace. For many
years women have suffered discrimination due to beliefs that women
were either unable to make decisions or act responsibly.2" The
PMDD classification and the PMS defense will inevitably lead to in-
creased discrimination.2 s°
228. Nora Mulligan, Recent Developments, Premenstrual Syndrome, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J.
219, 226 (1983).
229. See Scott Bronstein, Lawmakers Hear Horror Stories on Workers' Comp, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 2, 1991, at B3.
230. Although there will undoubtedly be discrimination in the workplace due to the
classification, it is questionable whether these women will have a cause of action under the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Under the ADA, an employer can not discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability. HENRY H. PERRIT JR., AmRicNs WrrH DisAmLxnEs Acr
HI-DBoox 3 (1990). A disability is defined as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being
regarded as having that impairment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (Supp. V 1993). The
Senate and House Committees report that mental impairment includes emotional or
mental illness. PERRI-I, supra, at 25. It would appear that premenstrual dysphoric disorder
fits within the ADA definition. It is important to note, though, that the determination
regarding who is disabled under the ADA is handled on a case by case analysis, and there-
fore, broad based conclusions regarding the cause of action are virtually impossible. Id. at
28.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate
against any individual with respect to compensation ... because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (1964). The term "because of... sex" has
been clarified by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to include (but not limited to) "be-
cause of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1978). In International Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991), the
Supreme Court stated that a policy that explicitly classifies on the basis of potential for
pregnancy must be regarded in the same light as explicit sex discrimination. Id. at 199.
Premenstrual dysphoric disorder, like pregnancy, only implicates one sex and women have
historically faced discrimination under both premises. Therefore, a Title VII cause of ac-
tion may exist for a woman who suffers discrimination on the basis of PMS.
Such a cause of action was successful in Corn Products Co. v. Erickson, No. A-3071-80-
T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 16, 1982). The Superior Court of NewJersey affirmed a
decision by the director of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights who found employment
discrimination when a female worker was discharged for absence from work due to pri-
mary dysmenorrhea. Id. at 9. Ms. Erickson proved that she was discharged because of
absenteeism resulting from a physical condition from which only women suffer, and that
workers who missed as much work as she did for non-sexual physical conditions were not
terminated. Id. at 39. Erickson analogized her premenstrual dysmenorrhea to pregnancy
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Women also risk discrimination with respect to family law issues.
In order to receive custody of a child, courts generally examine what is
in the best interest of the child. In hostile custody battles, it would not
be unreasonable for an opponent to classify the mother as suffering
from premenstrual dysphoric disorder. 3 Because a PMDD diagnosis
often relies solely on information given by the premenstrual sufferer
or one who has observed her on a monthly basis,2" 2 there are no
means to prove or disprove scientifically whether the woman actually
suffers from PMDD. The accusation could pose a real threat in cus-
tody proceedings. 3
CONCLUSION
The American Psychiatric Association's decision to categorize
premenstrual dysphoric disorder as a mood disorder in their "bible of
mental illness" has led to much contention over its potential impact
on women, the law, and society. Questions have existed throughout
history regarding the effects of the menstrual cycle on women with the
answers usually leading to social and economic inequality. Although
this Article has described what may be considered a positive result of
the most recent categorization, the theory may inevitably be used to
justify an "inferior status" for women in society.
Prior to the APA's diagnosis of PMS as a mental disease, a defense
based on its symptoms was difficult, if not impossible, to prove. The
PMDD classification alleviates many of the substantive and procedural
impediments associated with the defense. This alteration will make it
possible for women who commit crimes while suffering from PMS to
defend their actions. A fear remains, though, that a theory of "dimin-
ished responsibility" will act as a double edged sword, leading to preju-
dicial treatment in other areas of women's lives.
Premenstrual Syndrome is a real and serious problem for a small
minority of women, and their plight must be recognized. Dr.
Michelle Harrison recognized this necessity when she stated:
discrimination. Id. at 41. This argument, in conjunction with a disability argument
prevailed.
231. In Tingen v. Tingen, 446 P.2d 185 (Or. 1968), the Supreme Court of Oregon al-
lowed evidence of PMS to be considered as one of the factors in determining the best
interest of the child. Id. at 186. But the court further held that the lower court incorrectly
isolated factors relating to the mother's ill health to the exclusion of other relevant factors
in determining custody. Id. The court concluded that after balancing all of the relevant
evidence the best interests of the children would be met by granting custody to the
mother. Id. at 187.
232. Holtzman, supra note 132, at 714-15.
233. Id.
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I am fearful that in our society anything that comes up will
be used against women. But I see women whose lives are
wrecked by this, who feel they are crazy and can't talk about
it. If we don't accept that, we're denying one reality of wo-
men's experience, and at this point, it is more important to
do something about it, to deal with reality than be controlled
by our fears.25 4
Although the DSM-IV classification does recognize the problem, and
can arguably be said to increase the likelihood of research regarding
the malady, a question remains regarding the correct medical forum
to analyze the syndrome. Could the same effect be achieved by classi-
fying PMS as a gynecological, or endocrinological problem? This al-
ternative classification could limit the potential for discrimination, yet
increase awareness, and treatment of the syndrome.
The benefits of the PMDD classification must be weighed against
the potential abuse. For hundreds of years, myths and misconcep-
tions associated with the menstrual cycle have generated stigmatiza-
tion, stereotyping, and discrimination. The PMDD classification and
the PMS defense will probably contribute to negative attitudes associ-
ated with PMS. Due to the potential for grave misuse, the PMS de-
fense and the PMDD classification must be applied with extreme
caution and balanced against the many risks associated with such a
label.
LEE SOLOMON
234. Nadine Brozan, Premenstrual Syndrome: A Complex Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1982, at
C16.
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APPENDIX
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 4TH ED.
(DSM-IV)
Diagnostic Criteria For Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder
A. In most menstrual cycles during the past year, five (or more) of the
following symptoms were present for most of the time during the last
week of the luteal phase, began to remit within a few days after the
onset of the follicular phase, and were absent in the week postmenses,
with at least one of the symptoms being either (1), (2), (3), or (4):
(1) markedly depressed mood, feelings of hopelessness, or self-
depreciating thoughts
(2) marked anxiety, tension, feelings of being "keyed up," or
"on edge"
(3) marked affective lability (e.g., feeling suddenly sad or tear-
ful or increased sensitivity to rejection)
(4) persistent and marked anger or irritability or increased in-
terpersonal conflicts
(5) decreased interest in usual activities (e.g., work, school,
friends, hobbies)
(6) subjective sense of difficulty in concentrating
(7) lethargy, easy fatigability, or marked lack of energy
(8) marked change in appetite, overeating, or specific food
cravings
(9) hypersomnia or insomnia
(10) a subjective sense of being overwhelmed or out-of-control
(11) other physical symptoms, such as breast tenderness or swell-
ing, headaches, joint or muscle pain, a sensation of "bloating," weight
gain
Note: In menstruating females, the luteal phase corresponds to the
period between ovulation and the onset of the menses, and the follic-
ular phase begins with menses. In nonmenstruating females (e.g.,
those who have had a hysterectomy), the timing of luteal and follicu-
lar phases may require measurement of circulating reproductive
hormones.
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